Who is the Master Now? Regulatory and Contractual Challenges of Unmanned Vessels by Simon, Baughen
 
Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
New Technologies, Artificial Intelligence and Shipping Law in the 21st Century
                                                                    
   





Baughen, S. (2019).  Who is the Master Now? Regulatory and Contractual Challenges of Unmanned Vessels. Bar











This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 





Who is the master now? Regulatory and contractual challenges of unmanned vessels. 
 
Unmanned ships are coming, and coming soon. Kongsberg’s ‘Yara Birkeland’ will be the 
world’s first fully electric and autonomous container ship.  It will be equipped with various 
proximity sensors, Radar, Lidar1, AIS2, Camera, Infra Red camera, and its connectivity and 
communication will be through maritime broadband radio, satellite communications, and 
GSM.3 Loading and discharging will be done automatically using electric cranes and 
equipment. Berthing and unberthing will be done without human intervention, through an 
automatic mooring system. The ship will sail within 12 nautical miles from the coast, between 
3 ports in southern Norway. There will be three centres to handle emergency and exception 
handling, condition monitoring, operational monitoring, decision support, surveillance of the 
autonomous ship and its surroundings and all other aspects of safety. The planned time frame 
is for testing with a captain and small crew, placed in a container-based bridge, to start in the 
second half of 2018, delivery from the yard and testing of autonomous capability in 2019, with 
fully autonomous operation starting in 2020. 
 
Where the ‘Yara Birkeland’ leads, other autonomous ships are sure to follow, initially 
with small coastal and inland waterway vessels. Autonomous ships offer the attraction of 
reducing accidents, with an estimated 80% of maritime accidents being due to human error. 
They also offer a reduction in wage costs, estimated to form 30% of a shipowner’s operating 
costs, by eliminating an on-board crew. They may also offer fuel savings through the reduction 
in weight by eliminating the accommodation structure. However, autonomous vessels bring 
risks, notably that of a loss of control through malicious hacking, and loss of communication 
with shore-side control in periods of bad weather coupled with a reduction in datalink capacity. 
There will also be additional operational costs, such as the provision of shore-based controllers 
(‘SBC’) who will monitor the ship and navigate it remotely during sections of its voyage, as 
well as taking over navigation through remote operation when the ship gets into difficulty if 
weather and traffic conditions change considerably. The lack of an onboard crew will mean 
that no maintenance work can be done during the voyage, resulting in increased time in ports 
for such work. The lack of an onboard crew will also rule out the use of heavy fuel oil which 
is maintenance intensive and require the use of costlier marine diesel oil (MDO) or marine gas 
oil (MGO). Additionally, owners may need to use port agents to perform functions relating to 
loading and unloading of cargo, including issuing of bills of lading, which are currently 
performed by the master and crew. 
 
Unmanned vessels will also pose challenges for compliance with the international 
regulatory framework established through the various conventions of the International 
Maritime Organisation (‘IMO’). The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) recently 
embarked on a regulatory scoping exercise on how safe, secure and environmentally sound 
Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) operations may be addressed in IMO 
instruments.4 It has set out the following four point scale for MASS operations. 
                                                          
1 Light, Detection and Ranging. 
2 Automatic Identification System. 
3 Global System for Mobile Communication. 
4 At the 99th Session of MSC 16-25 May 2018 a correspondence group on MASS was set up to test the framework 
of this regulatory scoping with a view of reporting back to its next session, MSC 100 (3-7 December 2018).    The 
Correspondence Group will test the methodology by conducting an initial assessment of SOLAS regulation III/17-
1 (Recovery of persons from the water), which requires all ships to have ship-specific plans and procedures for 
recovery of persons from the water; SOLAS regulation V/19.2 (Carriage requirements for carriage of shipborne 
navigational equipment and systems); and Load Lines regulation 10 (Information to be supplied to the master).  If 
1. Ship with automated processes and decision support: Seafarers are on board to 
operate and control shipboard systems and functions. Some operations may be 
automated.  
2. Remotely controlled ship with seafarers on board: The ship is controlled and operated 
from another location, but seafarers are on board. 
3. Remotely controlled ship without seafarers on board: The ship is controlled and 
operated from another location. There are no seafarers on board. 
4. Fully autonomous ship: The operating system of the ship is able to make decisions 
and determine actions by itself. 
 
In this paper I propose to examine the challenges posed by the absence of an onboard 
crew on a cargo vessel. I shall examine the third scenario in the IMO’s scale where there is no 
onboard crew but navigation is effected by a mixture of complete autonomy through voyage 
programming and human intervention through SBCs monitoring the vessel’s progress 
throughout the voyage, undertaking some navigational operations themselves through remote 
operation, such as entering and leaving ports, and dealing with complex situations on the open 
seas which the autonomous algorithms are unable to deal with.  I shall be looking at the role of 
the master in the absence of an onboard crew. Can there still be a master through the SBC? In 
part one of this paper considers this question in the light of the various international regulations 
that govern ships. In part two this paper will examine the question from the contractual 
perspective, with reference to the master’s role under time and voyage charters. 
 
Part One. Regulation and the Master5    
 
The term ‘master’ is not defined in any international convention. The International Law of the 
Shipmaster defines the master as “a natural person who is responsible for a vessel and all things 
and persons in it and is responsible for enforcing the maritime laws of the flag state” – a 
definition which does not require such person be on board the vessel under their command.6 
National laws provide various definitions. In the UK s.313 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 
defines ‘master’ as ““every person (except a pilot) having command or charge of a ship”. The 
definition does not require on-board presence and could therefore encompass the SBC as 
remote operator of the vessel. It would not cover completely autonomous vessels as there would 
no longer be a person in command or charge of a ship whose navigation would be entirely 
under the control of the artificial intelligence with which it had been programmed. Other 




                                                          
time allows, it will also consider SOLAS regulations II-1/3-4 (Emergency towing arrangements and procedures) 
and V/22 (Navigation bridge visibility). 
5 This paper will proceed on the assumption that an unmanned vessel will constitute a ‘ship’.  Professor Sozer, in 
a report attached to the CMI Working Group on Ship Nomenclature, http://comitemaritime.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Letter-to-Presidents-of-NMLAs-re-IWG-on-Vessel-Nomenclature-080316.pdf 
<accessed 3September 2018 ,  analysed the definition of the terms in almost 20 key maritime conventions, and 
none link the definition of ship to the presence of crew on board. 
6 John A C Cartner, Richard P Fiske, Tara L Leiter, Informa 2009, 86. 
7 The CMI recently sent out a questionnaire on unmanned vessels to the Maritime Law Associations (MLA) of 19 
States. The MLAs of Brazil, China, and Croatia stated that the master is defined as a person on board the ship. All 
19 MLAs answered that neither the chief pre-programmer of an autonomous ship nor another designated person 
not immediately involved in the operation of the ship could constitute the master. See, ‘Summary of responses to 
the CMI questionnaire. http://www.comitemaritime.org/Unmanned-Ships/0,27153,115332,00.html <accessed 26 
July 2018>. 
It will be for flag states to determine the acceptability of unmanned vessels. Under art. 91 of 
UNCLOS it is for every State “to fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for 
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.”8 However, the focus on 
the position of flag states as regards unmanned vessels should not let us lose sight of the equally 
important position of port states. UNCLOS does not qualify the rights of states to regulate the 
admission of vessels to their ports.9 In the absence of a satisfactory regulatory framework being 
established through the IMO it is likely that many states will deny admission to unmanned 
vessels into their ports. The initial phase of unmanned vessels is likely to be coastal trading 
within the territorial sea of the flag state – as contemplated for the ‘Yara Birkeland’. 
  
Article 94 of UNCLOS sets out the duties of the flag state on manning of vessels. 
Paragraph 3 requires every State to “take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary 
to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: (b) the manning of ships, labour conditions 
and the training of crews, taking into account the applicable international instruments;” 
Paragraph 4 provides that “Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure:(b) that each 
ship is in the charge of a master and officers who possess appropriate qualifications, in 
particular in seamanship, navigation, communications and marine engineering, and that the 
crew is appropriate in qualification and numbers for the type, size, machinery and equipment 
of the ship;.” Paragraph 5 requires the flag state in taking these measures “[t]o conform to 
generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps 
which may be necessary to secure their observance”. 
 
These accepted international regulations are contained in the IMO Conventions. 
SOLAS10 chapter V, regulation 14 requires that “[f]rom the point of view of the safety of life 
at sea, all ships shall be sufficiently and efficiently manned”. This does not prescribe any 
particular level of manning, and does not require the presence of a crew on board. It is left to 
the flag state to decide what constitutes sufficient and efficient manning. There is no express 
requirement in any of the above provisions for at least one seafarer to be on board and it would 
be open for the flag state to decide that there would be sufficient and efficient manning with 
no onboard crew, provided there is proper assumption of crew functions by the SBC. The 
British Maritime Law Association, giving the UK response to the CMI’s recent questionnaire 
on unmanned vessels, stated that art. 94’s requirements were not prescriptive and arguably 
permitted unmanned operation if the relevant ship’s autonomous navigation system were 
sufficiently safe.  
 
SOLAS Chapter V contains two regulations that may be problematic for unmanned 
vessels. First, Regulation 24 provides for reversion to manual steering in hazardous 
navigational situations when heading and/or track control systems are in use. 
1. In areas of high traffic density, in conditions of restricted visibility and in all other 
hazardous navigational situations where heading and/or track control systems are in 
use, it shall be possible to establish manual control of the ship’s steering immediately. 
                                                          
8 Subject to the existence of a genuine link between the State and the ship. Article 91(2) provides that “Every State 
shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that effect. 
9 An unmanned vessel will almost certainly constitute a ship and as such under art. 17 of UNCLOS would have 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
10 Exemptions. Chapter 1. Reg 4(b) allows the flag state to exempt any ship which embodies features of a novel 
kind from requirements of Chapters II-1, II-2, III and IV. Flag administrations may accept equivalent solutions if 
satisfied at least as effective as that required by SOLAS. 
 
2. In circumstances as above, the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall have 
available without delay the services of a qualified helmsperson who shall be ready at 
all times to take over steering control. 
3. The changeover from automatic to manual steering and vice versa shall be made by 
or under the supervision of a responsible officer. 
4. The manual steering shall be tested after prolonged use of heading and/or track 
control systems, and before entering areas where navigation demands special caution. 
 
Second, Regulation 15 deals with the requirements for Bridge layout and contemplates 
a physical bridge on the vessel. The virtual bridge on shore for unmanned vessels falls outside 
the requirements. However, Regulation 3(2) of Part 3, exemptions, provides: 
 The Administration may grant to individual ships exemptions or equivalents of a partial 
or conditional nature, when any such ship is engaged on a voyage where the maximum 
distance of the ship from the shore, the length and nature of the voyage, the absence of 
general navigational hazards, and other conditions affecting safety are such as to render 
the full application of this chapter unreasonable or unnecessary, provided that the 
Administration has taken into account the effect such exemptions and equivalents may 
have upon the safety of all other ships. 
With an unmanned vessel, the existence of a virtual bridge on shore would constitute a 
“condition affecting safety such as to make the full application of the chapter unreasonable or 
unnecessary”. 
 
The International Regulations for the Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs) 
 
The COLREGS provide the navigational rules for vessels to follow with the aim of avoiding 
collisions. In the UK they are currently implemented by regulation 6 of the Merchant Shipping 
(Distress Signals and Prevention of Collisions) Regulations 1996 (UK), which provides: 
(1) Where any of these Regulations is contravened, the owner of the vessel, the master 
and any person for the time being responsible for the conduct of the vessel shall each 
be guilty of an offence punishable on conviction on indictment by imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding two years and a fine, or on summary conviction by a fine:  
The Rules apply “to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith 
navigable by seagoing vessels” and would therefore apply equally to unmanned vessels as to 
manned. Compliance with the COLREGs could be programmed into the unmanned vessel’s 
navigation software, but there will be a dynamic interaction in the navigation of the vessel 
between completely autonomous navigation in accordance with the voyage programming, and 
navigation by remote control by the SBC. If the SBC can be regarded as the master, they would 
only fulfil that role during their periods of remote navigation, and monitoring during 
autonomous navigation. Alternatively, they would be a ‘person for the time being responsible 
for the conduct of the vessel.’ If there is a breach of COLREGs during a period of autonomous 
navigation, due to a defect in the navigational software or defective voyage programming, the 
SBC would probably not commit an offence, unless there was a failure to intervene and assume 
remote control of the vessel on becoming aware of the impending breach of the Regulation.11 
A further question would be whether the software manufacturer would have committed an 
offence as a person ‘for the time being responsible for the conduct of the vessel.’ 
 
Three particular Regulations pose challenges for compliance by unmanned vessels. 
First, there is Rule 2 ‘Responsibility’ which provides:  
                                                          
11 Unless the SBC was also the voyage programmer and they had incorrectly programmed the voyage. 
 
(a) Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master or crew 
thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the 
neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or 
by the special circumstances of the case.  
 
(b) In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers 
of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including the limitations 
of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from these Rules necessary to 
avoid immediate danger.  
 
Rule 2 gives precedence to good seamanship over COLREG provisions. The rule presupposes 
the exercise of human judgment in the ‘ordinary practice of seamen’ and in the making of a 
decision to depart from the Rule when necessary to avoid immediate danger. This could be 
satisfied if the operating system provides the SBC with the ability to make informed nautical 
decisions and allows the vessel to act on the SBC’s remote instructions in good time. However, 
it would not be satisfied with a completely autonomous vessel.  
 
Second, there is Rule 5 ‘Look out’ which provides: “Every vessel shall at all times 
maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate 
in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation 
and of the risk of collision.”  The reference to “by sight and hearing” requires human agency, 
but does not require an onboard presence. A look out through an on shore virtual bridge manned 
by an SBC would satisfy this requirement. However, a completely autonomous vessel would 
not comply with Rule 5. 
 
Third, there is Rule 18 ‘Responsibilities between vessels’ which provides: 
(a)  A power‐driven vessel must give way to all other vessels (except a seaplane); sailing 
vessel must give way to a vessel not under command, a vessel restricted in her ability 
to manoeuvre and a vessel engaged in fishing; a vessel engaged in fishing gives way to 
vessel not under command and a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre. 
Gogarty and Hagger have argued that manned vessels must give way to unmanned vessels as 
these are either ‘not under command’ or ‘restricted in her ability to manoeuvre’.12  
 
These terms are defined in rule 3 as follows. “(f) The term “vessel not under command” 
means a vessel which through some exceptional circumstance is unable to manoeuvre as 
required by these Rules and is therefore unable to keep out of the way of another vessel.”  The 
reference to ‘some exceptional circumstance’ would not cover a vessel which by its nature is 
unable to manoeuvre as required by the Rules, but probably would cover a situation where the 
vessel has lost communication with the shore. This would be subject to the unmanned vessel’s 
ability to display the appropriate lights and signals in the event of a loss of shore 
communication.13 
 
“The term “vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre” means a vessel which from 
the nature of her work is restricted in her ability to manoeuvre as required by these Rules and 
is therefore unable to keep out of the way of another vessel. The term “vessels restricted in 
their ability to manoeuvre” shall include but not be limited to:  
                                                          
12 Brendan Gogarty and Meredith Hagger, ‘The Laws of Man over Vehicles Unmanned: The Legal Response to 
Robotic Revolution on Sea, Land and Air’ (2008) 19 Journal of Law, Information and Science 73, 115. 
13 Rule 27(a). 
(i) a vessel engaged in laying, servicing or picking up a navigation mark, submarine 
cable or pipeline;  
(ii) a vessel engaged in dredging, surveying or underwater operations;  
(iii) a vessel engaged in replenishment or transferring persons, provisions or cargo 
while underway;  
(iv) a vessel engaged in the launching or recovery of aircraft;  
(v) a vessel engaged in mine clearance operations; 
(vi) a vessel engaged in a towing operation such as severely restricts the towing vessel 
and her tow in their ability to deviate from their course.” 
The restriction in ability to manoeuvre derives from the nature of the vessel’s work and not 
from the nature of the vessel itself and none of the specific instances would cover the ordinary 
operation of an unmanned cargo vessel. Accordingly, unmanned vessels will be subject to the 
same priority rules as apply to manned vessels. 
 
The master’s duty to render assistance 
 
Three conventions impose a personal duty on the master to render assistance to persons in 
distress at sea. This raises issues as who, if anyone, will constitute the master, and what would 
be the content of the obligation in the case of an unmanned ship.  Article 98 (1) of the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’) provides: 
Every state shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so 
without serious danger to the ship (emphasis added), the crew or the passengers: 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; 
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of 
their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him 
(emphasis added); 
(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers 
and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of 
registry and the nearest port at which it will call.  
 
Chapter V, Regulation 33 of the 1974 International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea 
(‘SOLAS’) provides: 
the master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance 
(emphasis added), on receiving a signal from any source that persons are in distress at 
sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possible informing them or 
the search and rescue service that the ship is doing so. 
 
Article 11 of the 1910 Salvage Convention and Article 10(1) of the 1989 Salvage Convention 
provide: 
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel 
(emphasis added) and persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of 
being lost at sea. 
The master’s obligation to render assistance is not absolute and is qualified by the 
italicised wordings: ‘in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship”; “in 
so far as such action can be reasonably expected of him”; “a ship at sea which is in a 
position to be able to provide assistance”; and, “so far as he can do so without serious 
danger to his vessel.”   
With an unmanned ship, the most that the SBC can do is to communicate the need for help to 
other vessels in the area and to the coastal authorities. Assuming the SBC can be regarded as 
the master for these purposes, their obligations cannot extend beyond this.14 
 
The same is true of the two assistance obligations imposed under UK law by s.92 and s.93 of 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. In the event of a collision section 92 requires the master to 
render “such assistance as is practicable” to the other vessel. Section 93 requires the master 
“on receiving at sea a signal of distress [from an aircraft] or information from any source that 
[an] aircraft is in distress” to “[p]roceed with all speed to the assistance of the persons in distress 
the master to assist aircraft in distress “unless he is unable (emphasis added), or in the special 
circumstances of the case considers it unreasonable or unnecessary, to do so.” The italicised 
words again indicate that the SBC duty of assistance would be limited to one of communicating 
details of the aircraft in distress to other vessels in the area and the coastal authorities.  
 
Similar issues arise with regards to the master’s powers and duties under the 1998 Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
and its 2005 Protocol.15 
 
The master’s documentary obligations 
 
A variety of documentary obligations fall on the master under various international 
conventions. MARPOL provides reporting obligations in the event of oil spills and requires the 
keeping of various record books. The IMO civil liability conventions in force, the CLC 1969 
and 1992, the Bunker Oil Pollution Convention 2001, the 2007 Nairobi Wreck Removal 
Convention, all contain mandatory insurance provisions with the requirement that a ‘blue card’ 
evidencing this be kept on board the vessel, as does EU Directive 2009/20/EC on the insurance 
of shipowners for maritime claims.16 The UK’s implementing legislation requires the 
certificate to be carried on board the ship and to be produced on demand by the master “to any 
officer of customs and excise or of the Secretary of State and, if the ship is a United Kingdom 
ship, to any proper officer”. Failure to do carry the certificate or to produce it as required 
renders the master liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard 
scale.17 Unmanned vessels cannot comply with these regulations and provisions will need to 




Article III of the Intemational Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995,1997, and 2010 (‘STCW’) provides 
that “The Convention shall apply to seafarers serving on board seagoing ships entitled to fly 
the flag of a Party...” which would rule out its application to unmanned vessels. However, 
Regulation VIII/2(2) provides an obligation on flag administrations to: “require the master of 
every ship to ensure that watchkeeping arrangements are adequate for maintaining a safe watch 
                                                          
14  Similar problems arise with regard to the master’s obligations under  
15  Article 8 and Article 8 bis of the 2005 Protocol. 
16  The UK has implemented this through The Merchant Shipping (Compulsory Insurance of Shipowners for 
Maritime Claims) Regulations 2012, SI 2012 no 2267.Implementing EU Directive 2009/20/EC on the insurance 
of shipowners for maritime claims.  
17 Section 163 (6). 
18 The FAL Convention has made provision for the certificates it requires to be provided in electronic form but 
this does not affect the certification requirements in the IMO Civil Liability Conventions or in EU Directive 
2009/20/EC on the insurance of shipowners for maritime claims.  
or watches, taking into account the prevailing circumstances and conditions and that, under the 
master's general direction:1 officers in charge of the navigational watch are responsible for 
navigating the ship safely during their periods of duty, when they shall be physically present 
on the navigating bridge or in a directly associated location such as the chartroom or bridge 
control room at all times;” This clearly requires a physical presence on the vessel for 
watchkeeping and as matters currently stand the flag state administration would not be able to 
comply with the regulation with an unmanned vessel.  
 
 In the UK the STCW is implemented through the Merchant Shipping (Standards of 
Training Certification and Watchkeeping) Regulations 2015 (UK) 782. Part 2 of the regulations 
is concerned with training and certification and applies to a seafarer serving on board a sea-
going ship registered in the UK, but part 4, which covers safe manning and watchkeeping apply 
to sea-going ships which are: (a) UK ships wherever they are; and (b) other ships when in UK 
waters. Part 4, regs 47-49, brings in the watch keeping requirements in Regulation VIII/2 of 
the STCW which require a physical presence on the navigating bridge or a directly associated 
location such as the chartroom or bridge control room at all times. Regulation 46 also brings in 
documentary requirements as to manning. A UK ship must have in force safe manning 
document issued by the Secretary of State in respect of the ship and the manning of the ship, 
which must be kept on board the ship at all times.19 The master must ensure that the ship does 
not proceed to sea unless there is on board a valid safe manning document issued in respect of 
the ship and the manning of the ship complies with that document. Neither requirement can be 
satisfied with an unmanned vessel.  
 
However, regulation 50 provides that “The Secretary of State may grant on such terms, 
if any, as may be specified, exemptions from all or any of the provisions of this Part for classes 
of case or individual cases, and may amend or cancel any exemptions so granted.” Presumably 
exemptions could be granted in both cases provided the Secretary of State was satisfied as to 
the on shore virtual watchkeeping arrangements for the unmanned vessel, and was prepared to 
accept an electronic version of the safe manning document which would be accessible at all 
times to the relevant maritime authorities. 
 
Labour law and seafarers 
 
The SBC may undertake many of the functions of the master, but their employment will be 
entirely shore bound. The International Labour Organisation’s Maritime Labour Convention 
2006 deals with the living and working conditions of seafarers, defined in art. 2(f) as “any 
person who is employed or engaged or works in any capacity on board a ship to which this 
Convention applies.” Clearly, the Convention will have no relevance to unmanned ships which 
have no crew on board. Similarly, the master’s lien for wages and disbursements will not be 
available to the SBC. The lien presupposes some onboard presence on the vessel by the master 
as part of the crew.20  The provisions in Part III of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 which 
                                                          
19 Merchant Shipping (Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping) Regulations 2015 (UK) 782. Part 
4 Reg 46. 
20 See Clarke J in The Ever Success [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 824, 832. 
 “In my judgment the authorities show that a master or a seaman is entitled to wages and thus to a co-extensive 
maritime lien if he renders the service appropriate to his rank. That is as, say, master, chief engineer or seaman. 
He must be part of the crew of the ship, but need not necessarily render the service on board the ship or live on 
board the ship, but the service must be in a real sense referrable to the ship and the service must be rendered during 
a period when the particular claimant can fairly be said to be part of the crew of the ship.” The SBC can not be 
said to be part of the crew of the ship, as there is no crew. 
 
apply to “masters and seamen employed in sea-going ships (emphasis added)” will also have 
no application to the SBC who is not employed in a sea-going ship. 
 
The master’s civil liability 
 
The master’s conduct of the vessel may expose them to liabilities in tort for damage or loss of 
property or for personal injury or death. There are three provisions in international conventions 
that may protect the master from such liability, either in full or by limiting their exposure. First, 
art.III (4) of the 1992 CLC provides for responder immunity for the following parties. 
(a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; 
(b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, performs 
services for the ship; 
(c) any charterer (how so ever described, including a bareboat charterer), manager or 
operator of the ship; 
(d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on the 
instructions of a competent public 
authority; 
(e) any person taking preventive measures; 
(f) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e); 
unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the 
intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result. 
If the SBC is employed by the owner they would fall within (a). If the SBC is an independent 
contractor they would most likely fall within heading (a) as an ‘agent of the owner’, or within 
heading (b) as a person who, without being a member of the crew, performs services for the 
ship or an ‘operator’ under heading (c). 
 
Second, art. 1(4) of the 1976 LLMC provides: “If any claims set out in Article 2 are 
made against any person for whose act, neglect or default the shipowner or salvor is 
responsible, such person shall be entitled to avail himself of the limitation of liability provided 
for in this Convention.” If the SBC is employed by the shipowner, then they will be able to 
limit liability under the Convention. If, however, they are an independent contractor they will 
not be a person for whose, act neglect or default the shipowner or salvor is responsible, and 
will not, therefore, be able to limit liability.21 
 
Third, art. IV(bis) of the Hague-Visby Rules provides protection for the servant or agent 
of the carrier if they are sued in respect of loss or damage to goods covered by a contract of 
carriage falling under the Hague-Visby Rules,  by extending to them the benefit of the carrier’s 
defences and limits of liability under the Rules. This protection does not cover a servant or 
agent who is an independent contractor. If the SBC is employed by the owner they will be 
protected, but if they are an independent contractor they would have to rely on a ‘Himalaya’ 
clause in the bill of lading, whether the action be founded in contract or in tort. 
 
Criminal law and the master 
                                                          
21 In JD Irving Ltd v. Siemens Canada Ltd (The SPM 125) 2016 FC 287 the Federal Court of Canada held that 
Article 1(4) would afford limitation to a person only if the shipowner or salvor has vicarious liability for the 
actions of that person. The claim was brought against a firm of marine consultants to prepare stability calculations 
in respect of the loading of a cargo of large industrial equipment on and off the barge SPM125. As the shipowner 
would not be vicariously liable for the defaults of an independent contractor, the marine consultants were unable 
to limit their liability under 1976 LLMC 
 
The master may face criminal charges in respect of his operation of the vessel before the courts 
of a coastal state. A notorious example of this is the prison sentence imposed by the Spanish 
Courts on Captain Mangouras, the master of the ‘Prestige’, in connection with the oil spill from 
the vessel when it broke up in Spain’s EEZ in 2002. In the UK the master can incur liability in 
respect of a failure with regard to the failure to have on board, or to produce for inspection, the 
‘blue card’ in respect of mandatory liability provisions.  The master, together with the owner, 
is guilty of an offence if a ship which is in a port in the United Kingdom, or is a United Kingdom 
ship and is in any other port, is dangerously unsafe22, and also for failure to carry an oil record 
book in a UK ship.23 Discharges of oil into the sea when done with intent, (ii) recklessly, or 
(iii) with serious negligence attract the highest penal sanctions with the owner and master liable 
for a fine of up to £250,000.24  It should be noted that unmanned ships make it much harder for 




Part II.  Maritime Contracts and the Master. 
 
The navigational role of the master will be spread among two human participants, the 
programmer of the software for the vessel’s autonomous operation on the voyage, and the SBC 
who will monitor the vessel’s progress throughout its voyage and undertake navigation by 
remote operation for certain sections of the voyage. The programmer may or may not be the 
same person as the SBC, and programming may be performed by employees of the shipowner 
or by an independent contractor providing navigational services to owners of unmanned vessel. 
The master also has non-navigational functions. The master supervises the loading, stowing 
and discharge of the cargo carried on the vessel. The master signs bills of lading. These 
functions will require physical presence at the ports of loading and discharge, so cannot be 
assigned to the SBC. Owners will need to engage port agents to fulfil these functions. In this 
second section, I shall consider how charterparty forms will need to be adapted to accommodate 
the diffusion of the roles of the master to various land-based personnel. I shall take NYPE 2015 




Clause 2 imposes an obligation on owners that the vessel on delivery shall be seaworthy and 
in every way fit to be employed for the intended service, including the full complement of 
master, officers and ratings who meet the Standards for Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) requirements for a vessel of her tonnage. With an 
unmanned vessel these requirements will not be able to be satisfied even if the SBC could be 
regarded as the master, as the STCW requirements will not apply to onshore personnel. The 
                                                          
22 Section 98(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
23 Section 142 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
24 The Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations 1996 Regulation 36A applying penalties to 
breaches of Regulations 12, 13 and 16. The Regulation gives effect to of MARPOL and the stricter implementation 
of these regulations in EU Directive 2009. 
25 Veal, R & Tsimplis, M, ‘The integration of unmanned ships into the lex maritima’, (2017) L.M.C.L.Q. 303, 
318, write that “One option would be a representative of the unmanned shipping company in each country who 
would be criminally liable for the ship’s actions, in addition to the shore-based “master” and the owner. Such an 
arrangement could be effected by coastal states as a condition of entry of unmanned ships into their ports.” 
Effectively, the employment of a hostage in every port of call. 
 
owners’ obligations as regards crew reappear in cl. 6 which requires the vessel to have a full 
complement of master, officer and ratings. 
 
Other navigational obligations appear in cl.12(b) obliging the master to comply with 
the reporting procedure  of the Charterers’ weather routing service and to follow routing 
recommendations from that service provided that the safety of the Vessel and/or cargo is not 
compromised. There is also cl.38 which gives the Charterers the right to give instructions to 
the master as to slow steaming and ultra slow steaming, and cl. 15 which provides for the 
Charterers to furnish the master from time to time with all requisite instructions and sailing 
directions, in writing, in the English language, and for the master shall keep full and correct 
deck and engine logs of the voyage or voyages. Cl. 30, the BIMCO Hull Fouling Clause for 
Charterparties provides for cleaning always to be under the supervision of the master. 
 
Clause 8 contains three important obligations involving the master which are 
fundamental to the contractual structure of a time charter. The master is to perform the voyages 
with due despatch. The master is to be under the orders and directions of the Charterers as 
regards employment and agency.26 Charterers are to perform all cargo handling, under the 
supervision of the master.27  It is possible that three distinct entities perform these functions: 
the voyage programmer; the SBC; the owners’ agent at the loading and discharge port. The 
form could be amended by replacing the reference to the master with a simple reference to 
owners, or to owners and their agents.   
 
The master’s involvement with cargo operations appear at various places in the form. 
In addition to the supervision of cargo handling by charterers referred to in cl.8, the master is 
entitled to refuse cargoes or, if already loaded, to unload them at the Charterers’ risk and 
expense if the Charterers fail to fulfil their IMSBC Code or IMDG Code obligations as 
applicable.28 The important matter of bills of lading is dealt with in cl.31 which reiterates the 
familiar obligation of the master to sign bills of lading or waybills for cargo as presented in 
conformity with mates’ receipts. This is not a function that the SBC could perform, given that 
paper bills of lading will still be required. Alternatively, the Charterers or their agents may sign 
bills of lading or waybills on behalf of the  but this is subject to the Owners’/master’s prior 
written authority, always in conformity with mates’ receipts. Provision of mates’ receipts is 
probably not something that the SBC is going to be able to perform remotely and will fall to 
owners’ port agents. The clause could be amended, as with cl.8 to replace ‘the master’ with 
‘owners’ agents’. Clause 27 provides for cargo claims as between owners and charterers to be 
settled in accordance with the Inter-Club NYPE Agreement 1996 (as amended 1 September 
2011), or any subsequent modification or replacement thereof. 
 
                                                          
26 The nomination of ports is subject to an implied warranty that the port is prospectively safe. The obligation to 
nominate a safe port will extend to nomination of ports that have the facilities, such as sufficient internet access, 
to accommodate unmanned vessels. 
27 This will make charterers responsible for these operations. The addition of the words ‘and responsibility’ after 
‘supervision’ will shift responsibility back to the shipowners. 
28 29.Solid Bulk Cargoes/Dangerous Goods. “The Master shall be entitled to refuse cargoes or, if already loaded, 
to unload them at the Charterers’ risk and expense if the Charterers fail to fulfil their IMSBC Code or IMDG Code 
obligations as applicable.” 
Similar amendments will also be needed to clauses giving the master discretion as 
regards entry into areas affected by war risks29 and piracy30 as well as cl. 37 which requires the 
master to notify charterers of stevedore damage to the vessel within 24 hours. The reference in 
the off-hire provisions in cl.17 to “time lost from deficiency and/or default and/or strike of 
officers or crew” becomes redundant unless redrafted to refer to “servants or agents of the 
owners involved in the performance of the charter.” Clause 33(a) incorporates the ‘both to 
blame collision clause’ with its reference to any act, neglect or default of the Master, Mariner, 
Pilot or the servants of the Owners in the navigation or in the management of the vessel”. This 
could still cover defaults of the SBC as the functional equivalent of the master but could be 
amended to so that it refers to ‘the servants or agents of the Owners in the performance of this 
charter’. Other clauses in the form will be redundant with an unmanned vessel, such as that 
part of cl.13 on the space available to charterers that refers to accommodation for supercargo, 
and the reservation of proper and sufficient space for the vessel’s master, officers, ratings, 
tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, stores, cl.14 on charterer’s right to put a supercargo 




The form refers to crew or master in the following places. 
 
Clause.2 provides owners with a general exemption “even from the neglect or default 
of the Master or crew or some other person employed by the Owners on board or ashore 
for whose acts they would but for this Clause, be responsible or from unseaworthiness 
of the vessel…(emphasis added)”. The italicised words show that the exemption would 
continue to operate as regards errors by either the voyage programmer or the SBC.  
 
Clause 5(c) provides for the master to give charterers notification of stevedore damage 
as soon as is reasonably possible and to endeavour to obtain stevedores’ written 
acknowledgment of liability. This is a function that could not be performed by the SBC 
and would have to be performed by owners’ agents at the ports of loading and discharge. 
 
Clause.6 provides for “the vessel to give NOR if berth not available on vessel’s arrival 
on or off the port. Master to warrant that she is ready in all respects.” The SBC could 
give this warranty of readiness. 
 
Clause. 10. Bill of ladings to be signed by Master or by owners’ agents. There would 
be no problem here with the absence of a conventional onboard master as owners’ 
agents at the loading port could sign the bills. 
 
                                                          
29 34. BIMCO War Risks Clause CONWARTIME 2013 
The Vessel shall not be obliged to proceed or required to continue to or through, any port, place, area or zone, or 
any waterway or canal (hereinafter “Area”), where it appears that the Vessel, cargo, crew or other persons on 
board the Vessel, in the reasonable judgement of the Master  and/or the Owners, may be exposed to War Risks 
whether such risk existed at the time of entering into this Charter Party or occurred thereafter. 
30 39. BIMCO Piracy Clause for Time Charter 717 Parties 2013 
(a) The Vessel shall not be obliged to proceed or required to continue to or through, any port, place, area or zone, 
or any waterway or canal (hereinafter “Area”) which, in the reasonable judgement of  the Master and/or the 
Owners, is dangerous to the Vessel, her cargo, crew or other persons on board the Vessel due to any actual, 
threatened or reported acts of piracy and/or violent robbery and/or capture/seizure (hereinafter “Piracy”), whether 
such risk existed at the time of entering into this Charter Party or occurred thereafter. 
 
Clause11 contains the “Both to blame collision clause” which could be amended to so 
that it refers to ‘the servants or agents of the Owners in the performance of this charter’. 
 
There are then three clauses involving the role of the master or owners in the event of: 
strikes, cl.16 General strike clause; war, cl.17 War Risks clause, and; ice, cl.18 General 
ICE clause. The latter contains a reference to the master’s right to leave the loading port 




With an unmanned vessel jettison is unlikely to be a general average event, and expenses under 
rule XI for the wages and maintenance of crew in, to and at a port of refuge becomes otiose. 





The master appears in various places in the 1989 Salvage Convention. Article 6(2) provides: 
“The master shall have the authority to conclude contracts for salvage operations on behalf of 
the owner of the vessel. The master or the owner of the vessel shall have the authority to 
conclude such contracts on behalf of the owner of the property on board the vessel.” Should 
the SBC have this authority to conclude salvage contracts for the vessel owner? The provision 
is premised on there being an onboard master who is in a position to contract in an emergency. 
Once the master goes onshore, the need for this authority disappears. Owners can make salvage 
contracts as easily as the SBC.  The master’s duty of assistance under article 10 has already 
been mentioned. Other provisions refer to the ‘master or owners’ and would not pose any 
problem with the operation of an unmanned vessel.31 
 
 
Bills of lading. 
 
This is the subject of another paper in the colloquium. In brief, the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules will operate as regards carriage of cargoes in bills of lading when carried in unmanned 
vessels. It is the contract of carriage between the carrier and the shipper, the fact of carriage by 
sea, and the existence, or contractual contemplation, of a bill of lading that determines the 
applicability of the Rules. The nature of the ship in which the goods are carried is of no 
import.32 Similarly COGSA 1992 will also operate as regards the vesting of rights and 
obligations under bills of lading, waybills and ships delivery orders.33 
                                                          
31 Articles 8, 15 and 19. 
32 The one change will be in relation to the operation of art. IV (2)(a) which provides the carrier with a defence in 
the event of loss or damage being caused by “Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants 
of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship”. The absence of an on-board crew might be 
thought to remove this exception when the goods are being carried by an unmanned vessel. However, it is possible 
to regard the SBC as the functional equivalent of the master and therefore the carrier would still be able to rely on 
the exception in respect of loss or damage caused by any errors of navigation on their part. If the SBC is not 
regarded as the ‘master’ then they could constitute a ‘servant of the carrier’, although if the SBC is not employed 
by the carrier but is an independent contractor this would not be the case. It is doubtful whether negligence by the 
voyage programmer would fall within the exception as such negligence would render the vessel unseaworthy. 
Establishing the vessel’s seaworthiness will now need to take in both onboard conditions and shore-based 
conditions.  
33 The sole reference to the master in COGSA 1992 is in s.4 “A bill of lading which— (a)represents goods to have 




An unmanned vessel becomes effectively immune to attack by pirates. Control of the vessel 
may be obtained through hacking and taking control of its voyage software. This will not 
constitute piracy which is defined in art. 101 of UNCLOS as: “(a) any illegal acts of violence 
or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against 
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against 
a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;” This virtual 
means of taking control of a vessel will not involve any action “by the crew or the passengers 




A pilot is a navigational advisor but the vessel remains under the command of the master and 
the shipowner is vicariously liable for any negligence on the part of the pilot, whether the 
pilotage be compulsory or not. The AAWA project contemplates that on entering or leaving a 
port the SBC will either choose to ‘take teleoperation type control or increase the supervision 
level of the vessel’.35 It may, however, be the case that autonomous berthing will not be 
permitted by the port authority in which case some form of pilotage will be required.36 This 
will involve a split in the remote operation of the vessel, assuming that the vessel cannot be 
boarded.37 Luci Carey has identified various problems that this will entail.  
The master is the person who remains responsible for the safety of the ship. If the 
‘master’ is the SBO in another country, communicating with a pilot who may not be 
familiar with the operation of an autonomous ship, does the master really have 
command? Does the pilot have control? These concepts do not sit easily with the 
operation of an autonomous ship. The issue here is control. A pilot cannot take control 
of an autonomous ship unless the pilot is either able to instruct the SBO or board the 
ship and operate it manually. This assumes the pilot has not only local knowledge but 
also knowledge of how the autonomous ship operates. What happens if communications 
are lost? Who is liable for any loss that is incurred? Therefore it is crucial to identify 
the person that is ‘in command’ in relation to an autonomous ship. If the pilot has 
control of the autonomous ship, it may not be possible for the SBO, who is not only not 
                                                          
by the master of the vessel or by a person who was not the master but had the express, implied or apparent 
authority of the carrier to sign bills of lading, shall, in favour of a person who has become the lawful holder of 
the bill, be conclusive evidence against the carrier of the shipment of the goods or, as the case may be, of their 
receipt for shipment.” The italicised words show that the section will operate even when the bill is not signed by 
the master. 
34 The term ‘Pirates’ is defined in the Schedule to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 as including ‘passengers who 
mutiny and rioters who attack the ship from the shore.” Carver's Carriage by Sea (12th ed.), par. 183, has the 
definition: “Piracy is forcible robbery at sea, whether committed by marauders from outside the ship, or by 
mariners or passengers within it.” This was repeated in the fourth edition and was approved by Kennedy LJ in 
Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Co. Ltd., [1909] 1 K.B. 785,802. 
35 AAWA, ‘Remote and Autonomous Ships – The next steps’ (Position Paper, Rolls‐Royce plc, 2016), 12. 
https://www.utu.fi/en/units/law/research/research‐projects/Pages/aawa.aspx <accessed 17 August 2018> 
36 The AAWA project also suggests that either the SBC could become a licensed pilot for compulsory pilotage 
areas, or the autonomous ship could be given an exemption from the pilotage requirement. AAWA, ‘Remote and 
Autonomous Ships – The next steps’ (Position Paper, Rolls‐Royce plc, 2016), 12. 
37 At common law there could be no pilotage in this situation as pilotage only begins once the pilot is ‘on board 
[emphasis added] at a particular place for the purpose of conducting a ship through a river, road or channel or 
from or into a port’. The Adoni [1918] P 14. 
on board beside the pilot but quite possibly in another country altogether, to wrest 
control back again in the event the pilot appears to be in error.38 





Unmanned vessels will lead first to a fragmentation of the role of the master, and then to his 
disappearance.  With level 3 autonomous operation, the SBC will be able to be regarded as the 
functional equivalent of the master for some purposes in that they are the human entity that is 
in command of the vessel’s navigation through remote operation. However, it is unlikely that 
the SBC can be regarded as the functional equivalent of the master for all navigational 
purposes. Navigation of a vessel at level 3 involves three elements: (i) the voyage software; (ii) 
the programming of the voyage; (iii) the remote monitoring of the voyage and the assumption 
of remote navigational control where needed by the SBC. The second and third  of these 
elements involve human agency but the demarcation between these two is an issue that needs 
to be addressed in determining “who is the master now?”. Level 3 autonomy will see the ‘part 
master’. Indeed, if the SBC is treated as the functional equivalent of the master, we will see a 
multiplicity of masters. The SBCs will be land based. Assume three shifts in a 24 hour period 
you will have three persons in remote control of the vessel during a day. With a long voyage 
SBCs in another time zone may also be used, which would bring the total number of potential 
masters up to six. Furthermore, each controller will probably be in remote control of more than 
one vessel in their shift. A far cry from the traditional practice of one ship, one master. When 
we reach level 4 with full automation the master will disappear and become the ‘past master’.  
 
The CMI has produced a spreadsheet in its submission to the IMO identifying 
provisions in the IMO regulations that will need clarification or amendment to deal with 
unmanned vessels, and identifies numerous provisions with the comment ‘interpretation of the 
master’.39 The issue of the documentation that needs to be carried on board vessels, such as the 
‘blue card’ evidencing that mandatory liability insurance is in place, will also need to be 
addressed by allowing these requirements to be satisfied by electronic certificates. The STCW 
will need to be adapted to provide for training and certification standards for remote onshore 
controllers. There is also the need for the IMO to develop regulations on software security.  
BIMCO and the Comité International Radio Maritime, an organisation involved in the 
development of the marine electronics industry, have jointly prepared a proposed software 
maintenance standard that has been sent to the IMO for review. Its goal is to ensure software 
updates are secure and systematic for maintenance and to minimise hacking and malware 
problems.40 The urgency of this issue was brought home by the disruption to Maersk’s 
operation over ten days in the summer of 2017 as a result of collateral damage from the 
‘nopetya’ programme which probably originated as a cyber attack by Russia on Ukraine by 
introducing malware into a popular Ukrainian accounting package called ‘M.E.Doc’.41 
                                                          
38 Luci Carey, All Hands Off Deck? The Legal Barriers to Autonomous Ships. NUS Law Working Paper No. 
2017/011. NUS Centre for Maritime Law Working Paper 17/0626. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3025882 <accessed 17 August 2018>. 
39 ANNEX 2 to the CMI IWG Submission to MSC 99th Session. 
40 IMO was due to consider the standard at the NCSR meeting in February 2018. Pilot tests for the standard were 
carried out in 2017, and ISO has provisionally accepted the proposal. BIMCO said it expects a working group to 
complete the standard in 2021, when cyber security is due to become part of ISO standards. 
41 IMO has issued MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management and the Maritime Safety 
Committee, at its 98th session in June 2017, also adopted Resolution MSC.428(98) - Maritime Cyber Risk 
Management in Safety Management Systems. The resolution encourages administrations to ensure that cyber risks 
 
Contractually, the master’s role will also undergo substantial change. There will be no 
onboard master to sign bills of lading, to supervise cargo operations, to receive instructions 
from time charterers as to the vessel’s employment. It is unlikely that these functions will fall 
to the SBC and owners will have to fulfil them through employing port agents. However, this 
should not provide a serious problem for the contractual forms used in chartering and carriage 
of goods. Owners’ contractual obligations will remain the same, irrespective of who is 
navigating the vessel and who is signing bills of lading. There is much to be said for the removal 





                                                          
are appropriately addressed in existing safety management systems (as defined in the ISM Code) no later than the 




Various regulations impose direct obligations on the master, as the person in charge of the 
vessel. On whom will these fall if there is no one on board the vessel? Do we need to impose 
such obligations? Could they fall simply on the vessel owner? 
 
The software programming of the voyage must allow for alterations of the voyage, to cope with 
changes of port ordered by the charterer, or changes of destination after a charter is cancelled. 
 
The obligation to nominate a safe port will extend to nomination of ports that have the facilities, 
such as sufficient internet access, to accommodate unmanned vessels. 
